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Abstract
We study the functioning of secured and unsecured interbank markets in the presence 
of credit risk. The model generates empirical predictions that are in line with 
developments during the 2007-2009 financial crises. Interest rates decouple across 
secured and unsecured markets following an adverse shock to credit risk. The scarcity 
of underlying collateral may amplify the volatility of interest rates in secured markets. 
We use the model to discuss various policy responses to the crisis. 
Keywords: Financial crisis, Interbank market, Liquidity, Credit risk, Collateral 
JEL Classification: G01, G21, E58 5
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Non-Technical Summary 
Interbank markets play a key role in the financial system. They are vital for banks’ 
liquidity management. Secured, or repo, markets have been a fast-growing segment of 
money markets. They have doubled in size since 2002 with gross amounts outstanding 
of about $10 trillion in the United States and comparable amounts in the euro area just 
prior to the start of the crisis in August 2007. Since repo transactions are backed by 
collateral securities similar to those used in the central bank’s refinancing operations, 
repo markets are a key part of the transmission of monetary policy. At the same time, 
the interest rate in the unsecured three-month interbank market acts as a benchmark 
for pricing fixed-income securities throughout the economy. 
In normal times, interbank markets function smoothly. Rates are broadly stable 
across secured and unsecured segments, as well as across different collateral classes. 
Since August 2007, however, the functioning of interbank markets has become 
severely impaired around the world.  
One striking manifestation of the tensions in the interbank markets has been the 
decoupling of interest rates between the unsecured market and the market secured by 
government securities. Prior to the outbreak of the crisis in August 2007, the rates 
were closely tied together. In August 2007, they moved in opposite directions with the 
unsecured rate increasing and the secured rate decreasing. They decoupled again 
following the Lehman bankruptcy, and, to a lesser extent, just prior to the sale of Bear 
Stearns.
A second, related, feature of the tensions in the interbank markets has been the 
difference in the severity of the disruptions in the United States and in the euro area. 
While rates decoupled in both the US and the euro area, the decoupling and the 
volatility of the rates was more pronounced in the US. 
Why have secured and unsecured interbank interest rates decoupled? Why has the 
US repo market experienced significantly more disruptions than the euro area market? 
What underlying friction can explain these developments? And what policy responses 
are possible to tackle the tensions in interbank markets? 
To examine these questions, we use a model with both secured and unsecured 
interbank lending in the presence of credit risk. It is often argued that credit risk and 6
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1107
November 2009
the accompanying possibility of default, stemming from the complexity of 
securitization, were at the heart of the financial crisis.  
Unsecured markets are particularly vulnerable to changes in the perceived 
creditworthiness of counterparties. In repo transactions, such concerns are mitigated 
to some extent by the presence of collateral. Our model illustrates, however, that 
tensions in the unsecured market can spill over to the market secured by collateral of 
the highest quality. The credit risk stemming from banks’ risky investments will affect 
the price of safe government bonds as long as banks participate in both secured and 
unsecured lending. In equilibrium there must not be an arbitrage opportunity between 
the two markets. Moreover, we show that the volatility of repo rates can be 
exacerbated by structural characteristics such as the scarcity of securities that are used 
as collateral. 
In many countries, central banks have reacted to the observed tensions in 
interbank markets by introducing support measures, trying to avoid market-wide 
liquidity problems turning into solvency problems for individual institutions. We use 
our framework to shed light on some policy responses. Specifically, we examine how 
the range of collateral accepted by a central bank affects the liquidity conditions of 
banks and how central banks can help alleviate tensions associated with the scarcity of 
high-quality collateral. In line with the predictions of the model, we present evidence 
that these measures can be effective at reducing tensions in secured markets. At the 
same time, they are not designed to resolve the underlying problems in the unsecured 
segment and the associated spill-overs, if those are driven by credit risk concerns. 7
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1 Introduction
Interbank markets play a key role in the ﬁnancial system. They are vital for banks’ liquidity
management. Secured, or repo, markets have been a fast-growing segment of money markets:
They have doubled in size since 2002 with gross amounts outstanding of about $10 trillion
in the United States and comparable amounts in the euro area just prior to the start of the
crisis in August 2007. Since repo transactions are backed by collateral securities similar to
those used in the central bank’s reﬁnancing operations, repo markets are a key part of the
transmission of monetary policy. At the same time, the interest rate in the unsecured three-
month interbank market acts as a benchmark for pricing ﬁxed-income securities throughout
the economy.
In normal times, interbank markets function smoothly. Rates are broadly stable across
secured and unsecured segments, as well as across diﬀerent collateral classes. Since August
2007, however, the functioning of interbank markets has become severely impaired around
the world. The tensions in the interbank market have become a key feature of the 2007-09
crisis (see, for example, Allen and Carletti, 2008, and Brunnermeier, 2009).
One striking manifestation of the tensions in the interbank markets has been the decou-
pling of interest rates between secured and unsecured markets. Figure 1 shows the unsecured
and secured (by government securities) three-month interbank rates for the euro area since
January 2007. Prior to the outbreak of the crisis in August 2007, the rates were closely
tied together. In August 2007, they moved in opposite directions with the unsecured rate
increasing and the secured rate decreasing. They decoupled again following the Lehman
bankruptcy, and, to a lesser extent, just prior to the sale of Bear Stearns.
A second, related feature of the tensions in the interbank markets has been the diﬀerence
in the severity of the disruptions in the United States and in the euro area. Figure 2 shows
rates in secured and unsecured interbank markets in the United States. As in the euro area,
there is a decoupling of the rates at the start of the ﬁnancial crisis and a further divergence
after the sale of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman. However, the decoupling and8
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Figure 1: Decoupling of secured and unsecured interbank rates in the EA
the volatility of the rates is more pronounced than in the euro area.
Why have secured and unsecured interbank interest rates decoupled? Why has the US
repo market experienced signiﬁcantly more disruptions than the euro area market? What
underlying friction can explain these developments? And what policy responses are possible
to tackle the tensions in interbank markets?
To examine these questions, we present a model of interbank markets with both secured
and unsecured lending in the presence of credit risk. Credit risk and the accompanying
possibility of default, stemming from the complexity of securitization, was at the heart of
the ﬁnancial crisis (see Gorton, 2008, 2009, and Taylor, 2009). We model the interbank
market in the spirit of Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), who in turn build on Diamond and9
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Figure 2: Decoupling of secured and unsecured interbank rates in the US
Dybvig (1983). Banks face liquidity demand of varying intensity. Some may need to realize
cash quickly due to demands of customers who draw on committed lines of credit or on their
demandable deposits. Since idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are non-contractible, this creates
a scope for an interbank market where banks with excess liquidity trade with banks in need
of liquidity.
Banks can invest in liquid assets (cash), illiquid assets (loans), and in bonds. In their
portfolio choice, they face a tradeoﬀ between liquidity and return. Illiquid investments are
proﬁtable but risky.1 Banks can obtain funding liquidity in the unsecured interbank market
1Illiquidity as a key factor contributing to the fragility of modern ﬁnancial systems is emphasized by
Diamond and Rajan (2008) and Brunnermeier (2009), for example.10
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by issuing claims on the illiquid investment, which has limited market liquidity.2 Due to
the risk of illiquid investments, banks may become insolvent and thus unable to repay their
interbank loan. This makes unsecured interbank lending risky. To compensate lenders,
borrowers have to pay a premium for funds obtained in the unsecured interbank market.
To model the secured interbank market, we introduce bonds that provide a positive net
return in the long-run. Unlike the illiquid asset, they can also be traded for liquidity in the
short-term. We consider the case of safe bonds, e.g. government bonds. Since unsecured
borrowing is costly due to credit risk, banks in need of liquidity will sell bonds to reduce their
borrowing needs. We assume that government bonds are in ﬁxed supply and that they are
scarce enough not to crowd out the unsecured market. The risk of banks’ illiquid assets will
aﬀect the price of safe government bonds since banks with a liquidity surplus must be willing
to both buy the bonds oﬀered and lend in the unsecured interbank market. In equilibrium
there must not be an arbitrage opportunity between secured and unsecured lending. We use
the link between secured and unsecured markets to derive a number of empirical predictions.
This paper is part of a growing literature analyzing the ability of interbank market to
smooth out liquidity shocks. We use the framework developed by Freixas and Holthausen
(2005) who examine the scope for the integration of unsecured interbank markets when
cross-country information is noisy. They show that introducing secured interbank markets
reduces interest rates and improves conditions when unsecured markets are not integrated.
Their introduction may, however, hinder the process of integration.
Several recent papers examine various frictions in interbank markets that can justify a
policy intervention. The role of asymmetric information about credit risk is emphasized in
Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009). The model generates several possible regimes in
the interbank market, including one in which trading breaks down. The regimes are akin
to the developments prior to and during the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Imperfect compe-
tition is examined in Acharya, Gromb, and Yorulmazer (2008). If liquidity-rich banks use
2See also Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) who distinguish between market liquidity and funding liq-
uidity.11
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their market power to extract surplus from liquidity-poor banks, a central bank can pro-
vide an outside option for the latter. Freixas, Martin, and Skeie (2008) show that when
multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria exist in the interbank market, a central bank can act as
a coordination device for market participants and ensure that a more eﬃcient equilibrium
is reached. Freixas and Jorge (2009) analyze the eﬀects of interbank market imperfections
for the transmission of monetary policy. Bruche and Suarez (2009) explore implications of
deposit insurance and spatial separation for the ability of money markets to smooth out
regional diﬀerences in savings rates. Acharya, Shin, and Yorulmazer (2009) study the eﬀects
of ﬁnancial crises and their resolution on banks’ choice of liquid asset holdings. In Allen,
Carletti, and Gale (2009), secured interbank markets can be characterized by excessive price
volatility when there is a lack of opportunities for hedging aggregate and idiosyncratic liq-
uidity shocks. By using open market operations, a central bank can reduce price volatility
and improve welfare.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the set-up
of the model. In section 3, we solve the benchmark case when banks can only trade in the
unsecured interbank market. In Section 4, we allow banks to invest in safe bonds. In Section
5, we present empirical implications and relate them to the developments during the 2007-09
ﬁnancial crisis. In Section 6, we discuss policy responses to mitigate the tensions in interbank
markets and in Section 7 we oﬀer concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The model
The model is based on Freixas and Holthausen (2005). There are three dates, t =0 ,1, and
2, and a single homogeneous good that can be used for consumption and investment. There
is no discounting between dates.
3Aggregate shortages are also examined in Diamond and Rajan (2005) where bank failures can be con-
tagious due to a shrinking of the pool of available liquidity. Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet (2000) analyze
systemic risk and contagion in a ﬁnancial network and its ability to withstand the insolvency of one bank.
In Allen and Gale (2000), the ﬁnancial connections leading to contagion arise endogenously as a means of
insurance against liquidity shocks.12
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There is a [0,1] continuum of identical, risk neutral, proﬁt maximizing banks. We assume
that the banking industry is perfectly competitive. Banks manage the funds on behalf of risk-
neutral households with future liquidity needs.4 To meet the liquidity needs of households,
banks oﬀer them claims worth c1 and c2 that can be withdrawn at t = 1 and t =2 , e.g.
demand deposits or lines of credit. We assume that c1 > 0. Households do require some
payout in response to their liquidity need at t =1 .5 The aggregate demand for liquidity is
certain: a fraction λ of households withdraws their claims at t =1 . The remaining fraction
1 − λ withdraws at t = 2. At the individual bank level, however, the demand for liquidity
is uncertain. A fraction πh of banks face a high liquidity demand λh >λat t = 1 and the
remaining fraction πl =1− πh of banks faces a low liquidity demand λl <λ . Hence, we
have λ = πhλh + πlλl. Let the subscript k = l,h denote whether a bank faces a low or a
high need for liquidity at t = 1. Since aggregate liquidity needs are known, a bank with a
high liquidity shock at t = 1 will have a low liquidity shock at t =2:1− λh < 1 − λl. We
assume that banks’ idiosyncratic liquidity shocks are not contractible. A bank’s demandable
liabilities cannot be contingent on whether it faces a high or a low liquidity shock at t =1
and t =2 . This is the key friction that will give rise to an interbank market.
At t = 0, banks invest the funds of households either into long-term illiquid asset (loans),
a short-term liquid asset (cash), or into government bonds. We assume that each bank has
one unit of the good under management at t = 0. Each unit invested in the liquid asset oﬀers
a return equal to 1 unit of the good after one period (costless storage). Each unit invested in
the illiquid asset yields an uncertain payoﬀ at t = 2. The investment into the illiquid asset
can either succeed with probability p or fail with probability 1−p. If it succeeds, the bank is
4We do not address the question of why households use banks to manage their funds, nor why banks
oﬀer demandable debt in return. Moreover, we abstract from any risk-sharing concerns and side-step the
question whether interbank markets are an optimal arrangement. There is a large literature dealing with
these important normative issues, starting with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Bhattacharya and Gale (1987),
Jacklin (1987). For recent examples, see Diamond and Rajan (2001), Allen and Gale (2004), or Farhi,
Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008).
5In principle, risk-neutral households are indiﬀerent between consuming at t = 1 and t = 2. In order to
have an active interbank market, we assume that some households will have a strictly positive need for early
consumption, which must be satisﬁed by banks. For example, some households may have to pay a tax at
t =1 .13
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solvent and receives a return on the illiquid investment worth R units of the good at t =2 .
If the investment fails, we assume that the bank is insolvent and is taken over by a deposit
insurance fund. The fund assumes all the liabilities of an insolvent bank.6 The investment
into the illiquid asset does not produce any return at t = 1. Moreover, the illiquid asset is
non-tradable.
Government bonds yield a certain return equal to Y at t =2 . We assume that pR > Y > 1
so that bonds do not dominate the illiquid asset. Like the illiquid long-term investment, gov-
ernment bonds do not oﬀer a return at t =1 . Unlike the illiquid asset, however, government
bonds can be traded at t = 1 at a price P1. Since we employ the term “liquidity” as the
ability to produce cash-ﬂow at t =1 , the liquidity of government bonds is therefore endoge-
nous. Government bonds are in ﬁxed supply. Let B denote the supply of government bonds
to the banking sector at t =0 . 7
Banks face a trade-oﬀ between liquidity and return when making their portfolio decision
at t = 0. The short-term liquid asset allows banks to satisfy households’ need for liquidity at
t = 1. The illiquid asset is more proﬁtable in the long run. Government bonds lie in between
and are in ﬁxed supply. Let α denote the fraction of bank assets at t = 0 invested in the
illiquid asset, β denote the fraction invested in government bonds and 1− α − β denote the
remaining fraction invested in the liquid asset.
Since banks face diﬀerent liquidity demands at t = 1, interbank markets can develop.
Banks with low level of withdrawals can provide liquidity to banks with high level of with-
drawals. We consider both secured and unsecured interbank markets. For ease of exposition,
we model the secured market (repo agreements) as the trading of government bonds and treat
1
P1 as the repo rate.8 The unsecured market consists of borrowing and lending amounts Ll
and Lh, respectively, at an interest rate r. Given that banks can be insolvent when their
6Thus, banks are protected by limited liability. Note that the deposit insurance fund only intervenes if
the bank is insolvent, i.e. if the illiquid investment has failed.
7As we will show, if bonds were in unlimited supply, banks would prefer to satisfy their liquidity needs
at t = 1 solely by trading bonds to avoid the risk premium of unsecured borrowing.
8In interbank repo markets, government bonds serve as collateral. The diﬀerence to an outright sale of
bonds is that the original owner of the bond still collects the interest payment Y .14
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Figure 3: Assets and ﬁnancial claims
illiquid investment fails, lenders in the unsecured interbank market will be exposed to credit
risk. The deposit insurance fund does not cover interbank loans. However, borrowers always
have to repay their interbank loan if they are solvent. Should a borrowers’ counterparty be
insolvent, the repayment goes to the deposit insurance fund. We denote the probability that
an unsecured interbank loan is repaid by ˆ p.
We assume that the interbank markets for unsecured loans and for government bonds are
anonymous and competitive. Banks are price takers and are completely diversiﬁed across
unsecured interbank loans. That is, a lender’s expected return per unit lent in the unsecured
interbank market is pˆ p(1+r). With probability p a lender is solvent, in which case he collects
the interest repayment 1 + r on a proportion ˆ p of the interbank loans made. The per unit
expected cost to a borrower is p(1 + r).
Figure 3 summarizes the payoﬀs of assets and ﬁnancial claims. Note that the payoﬀ
shown for risky interbank debt is conditional on banks being solvent at t =2 .
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 4. At t = 0, banks invest households’
funds in illiquid loans, government bonds and cash. Government bonds are in ﬁxed supply to
the banking sector and their price at t =0 ,P0 must be such that i) the market for government15
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bonds at t = 0 clears and ii) it is consistent with banks’ optimal holding of government bonds.
At t = 1, after receiving an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, banks manage their liquidity by
borrowing or lending in the unsecured interbank market, buying or selling government bonds
and possibly reinvesting into the liquid asset in order to maximize bank proﬁts at t =2 ,
taking their portfolio allocation (α,β,1 − α − β) and the payout to households (c1,c 2)a s
given. Both the interbank market for unsecured loans and for government bonds must clear.
Prices are set by a Walrasian auctioneer so that i) decentralized trading is consistent with
banks’ portfolios of bonds, illiquid loans and cash, and ii) there is no arbitrage opportunity
between government bonds and unsecured interbank loans. At t = 2, returns on the illiquid
asset and bonds are realized, interbank loans are repaid and solvent banks pay out all their
cash-ﬂow to households.

time t=0 t=1 t=2
Banks oﬀer deposit con-
tracts (c1,c 2).
Banks invest into a risky
illiquid asset, a safe liq-




Banks borrow and lend in se-
cured and/or unsecured inter-
bank markets. Additionally,
they can reinvest into the liq-
uid asset.
A fraction of households with-
draws and consumes c1.
The return of the illiq-
uid asset and the govern-
ment bond realize.





Figure 4: The timing of events
3 Benchmark: no government bonds
In this section we solve the model without government bonds (i.e. β = 0). The analysis
clariﬁes how the model works and provides a benchmark. The main text gives the outline
of the arguments. The details of the proofs are in the Appendix. We proceed backwards by16
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ﬁrst considering banks’ liquidity management at t =1 .
Liquidity management. Having received liquidity shocks, k = l,h, banks manage their
liquidity at t = 1 while taking their assets (α,1 − α) and liabilities (c1,c 2) as given.
A bank that faces a low level of withdrawals at t =1 ,k = l, has spare liquidity. The
bank can thus choose to lend an amount Ll at a rate r in the interbank market. The bank
can also reinvest a fraction γ1
l of funds leftover in the liquid asset. At t =1 ,at y p e - l bank






l (1 − α)+ˆ p(1 + r)Ll − (1 − λl)c2] (1)
subject to
λlc1 + Ll + γ
1
l (1 − α) ≤ (1 − α)
and feasibility constraints: 0 ≤ γ1
l ≤ 1 and Ll ≥ 0.
Conditional on being solvent (with probability p), the proﬁts at t = 2 of a bank with a
surplus of liquidity at t = 1 are the sum of the proceeds from the illiquid investment, Rα,
from the reinvestment into the liquid asset, γ1
l (1−α), and the repayments of risky interbank
loans, ˆ p(1 + r)Ll, minus the payout to households withdrawing at t =2 ,( 1− λl)c2. The
budget constraint requires that the outﬂow of liquidity at t = 1 (deposit withdrawals, λlc1,
reinvestment into the liquid asset, γ1
l (1 − α), and interbank lending, Ll) is matched by the
inﬂow (return on the liquid asset, 1 − α).











h(1 − α) ≤ (1 − α)+Lh
and feasibility constraints: 0 ≤ γ1
h ≤ 1 and Lh ≥ 0.17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1107
November 2009
There are two diﬀerences between the optimization problems of a lender and a borrower.
First, a borrower expects having to repay (1+r)Lh with probability p while a lender expects
a repayment ˆ p(1 + r)Ll with probability p. A lender is exposed to credit risk. Second,
interbank loans are an outﬂow for a lender and an inﬂow for a borrower.
Given that banks must provide some liquidity to households, c1 > 0, the interbank market
will be active as banks trade to smooth out the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, Ll > 0 and
Lh > 0.
The marginal value of (inside) liquidity at t =1 ,1 −α, is given by the Lagrange multiplier,
denoted by μk, on the budget constraints of the optimization problems (1) and (2).
Lemma 1 (Marginal value of liquidity) The marginal value of liquidity is μl = pˆ p(1+r)
for a lender and μh = p(1 + r) for a borrower.
A lender values liquidity at t = 1 since he can lend it out at an expected return of
pˆ p(1 + r). A borrower values liquidity since it saves the cost of borrowing in the interbank
market, p(1+r). The marginal value of liquidity is lower for a lender because of credit risk.
The following result describes banks’ decision to reinvest into the liquid asset.
Lemma 2 (Reinvestment into the liquid asset) A borrower does not reinvest in the
liquid asset at t =1 : γ1
h =0 . A lender does not reinvest in the liquid asset if and only
if ˆ p(1 + r) ≥ 1.
It cannot be optimal for a bank with a shortage of liquidity to borrow in the interbank
market at rate 1 + r and to reinvest the obtained liquidity in the liquid asset since it would
yield a negative net return. The same is not true for a lender since his rate of return on
lending in the interbank market is only ˆ p(1 + r) due to credit risk. If a lender reinvests his
liquidity instead of lending it out, then the interbank market cannot be active. Thus, we
have to check whether ˆ p(1+r) ≥ 1 once we have obtained the interest rate in the interbank
market.
Market clearing in the interbank market, πlLl = πhLh, yields:18
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Lemma 3 (Interbank market clearing) The amount of the liquid asset held by banks
exactly balances the aggregate payout at t =1 :
λc1 =1− α.
The interbank market fully smoothes out the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, λk.
Pricing liquidity. The price of unsecured interbank loans, 1 + r, which banks take
as given when making their portfolio choice, must be consistent with an interior portfolio
allocation, 0 <α<1. The proﬁtability of the illiquid asset implies that a bank would never
want to invest everything into the liquid asset and thus α>0. The need for a positive payout
to households at t =1 ,c1 > 0, implies that banks will not be able to invest everything into
the illiquid asset, α<1.












Ll =( 1 − α) − λlc1 (4)
Lh = λhc1 − (1 − α), (5)
where we have used that γ1
k = 0 (Lemma 2).
The ﬁrst-order condition requires that
πhp(1 + r)+πlpˆ p(1 + r)=πhpR + πlpR,
or, equivalently,
(πh + πlˆ p)(1 + r)=R. (6)19
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The interbank interest rate r, i.e. the price of liquidity traded in the unsecured interbank
market, is eﬀectively given by a no-arbitrage condition. The right-hand side is the expected
return from investing an additional unit into the illiquid asset, R. The left-hand side is the
expected return from investing an additional unit into the liquid asset. With probability
πh, a bank will have a shortage of liquidity at t = 1 and one more unit of the liquid asset
saves on borrowing in the interbank market at an expected cost of (1 + r) (conditional on
being solvent). With probability πl, a bank will have excess liquidity and one more unit of
the liquid asset can be lent out at an expected return ˆ p(1 + r) (again conditional on being
solvent). Note that banks’ own probability of being solvent at t =2 ,p, cancels out in (6)
since it aﬀects the expected return on the liquid and the illiquid investment symmetrically.
What is the level of credit risk? Since lenders hold a fully diversiﬁed portfolio of unsecured
interbank loans, the proportion of loans that will not be repaid is given by the proportion
of borrowers whose illiquid investment failed and who are thus insolvent at t =2 ,
1 − ˆ p =1− p. (7)
We therefore have the following result:












is the premium of lending in the interbank market due to banks’ risky assets.
Given the price of liquidity (8), a bank with a surplus of liquidity will always want to
lend it out rather than reinvest it. That is, the condition in Lemma 2 is always satisﬁed:
pR
δ > 1 since pR > 1 and δ<1.20
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Liquidity becomes more costly when i) asset risk increases (lower p) and ii) a bank is
more likely to become a lender (higher πl) and thus is more likely to be subject to credit
risk.
Portfolio allocation. A bank’s portfolio allocation α must be consistent with the
promised payout to households, as well as market clearing and competition. We assume that
banks payout everything to households at t = 2. For a solvent bank that has lent in the
unsecured interbank market this means that
Rα +ˆ p(1 + r)[(1 − α) − λlc1] − (1 − λl)c2 =0 ,
while for a solvent bank that has borrowed it must be that
Rα − (1 + r)[λhc1 − (1 − α)] − (1 − λh)c2 =0 .
Both types of banks must break-even at t = 2 when solvent.9 Note that a bank’s payout
to households at t = 2 cannot be contingent on whether it has lent or borrowed at t =1 .
Using i) market clearing at t = 1 (Lemma 3), which links the proportion investment into the
liquid asset 1 − α to the payout c1, ii) the price of liquidity at t = 1 (equation (8)) and iii)
the link between credit and asset risk (equation (7)), we arrive at the following result:







(1 − λl)πl +( 1− λh)πhp
λlπl + λhπh
. (10)
A bank chooses to hold a more liquid portfolio if it expects a higher level of withdrawals
at t =1( λk increases). With respect to the probability of becoming a lender, πl, and asset
9We also assume that the deposit insurance fund only intervenes if banks’ illiquid investment fails (see
footnote 6). If the investment succeeds, banks are not allowed to default on their deposits at t = 2 for
regulatory reasons. The assumption that deposit insurance only intervenes when the illiquid investment fails
is for simplicity only. The assumption is responsible for the clean link between asset risk and credit risk in
the interbank market, ˆ p = p.21
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risk, p, there are two eﬀects at play: the risk premium 1
δ and the ratio between withdrawals
at t = 1 versus t = 2 (the second fraction on the right-hand side of (10)). With respect to the
probability of becoming a lender, both eﬀects go in the same direction: higher πl increases
the risk premium and the relative proportion of t = 2 withdrawals.10 Consequently, a higher
probability of having a liquidity surplus at t = 1 leads to a less liquid portfolio at t =0 .
With respect to the risk of banks’ illiquid assets, p, the two eﬀects work in opposite
directions. More asset risk increases the risk premium in the unsecured market but lowers
the ratio of t = 2 versus t = 1 withdrawals. Higher asset risk means more credit risk for
lenders and, consequently, less proﬁts and a lower payout at t = 2. At the same time, lenders
have more withdrawals than borrowers at t = 2, yet banks’ withdrawable claims cannot be
made contingent on banks’ idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. To counter this imbalance at t =2 ,
a bank holds more liquid assets when asset risk is higher. This allows it to lend more and
thus to increase revenue at t = 2 in case it received a low liquidity shock at t =1 . Similarly,
it decreases its revenue at t = 2 in case it received high liquidity shock and ends up being a
borrower. The derivative of the right-hand side of equation (10) with respect to p is negative
if and only if
(1 − λh)π
2
h < (1 − λl)π
2
l . (11)
A suﬃcient condition for more credit risk leading to less liquid investments is that banks are
(weakly) more likely to have a liquidity surplus than a shortage, πl ≥ πh or πl ≥ 1
2.
A benchmark - no risk. It is useful to consider the benchmark case when there is no
asset risk and hence no credit risk. Substituting p = 1 into (10) yields the following result:
Corollary 1 (No risk) Without risk, p =1 , the interest rate in the unsecured interbank
market 1+r is equal to R, and the fraction invested in the illiquid asset is equal to expected
amount of withdrawals at t =2 : α∗ =1− λ.
Without asset risk there is no credit risk for lenders in the unsecured interbank market.
10The derivative with respect to πl of the second fraction on the right-hand side of (10) is positive if and
only if λh(1 − λl) >p λ l(1 − λh). This always holds since λh >λ l.22
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The amount invested in the liquid asset exactly covers the expected amount of withdrawals
at t = 1. The interbank market smoothes out the problem of uneven demand for liquidity
across banks at no cost. The fraction invested in the illiquid investment exactly covers the
expected amount of withdrawals at t = 2. Without credit risk, lenders no longer lose revenue
at t =2 .
4 Access to government bonds
In this section we allow banks to invest a fraction β of their portfolio into government bonds
at t = 0 and to trade these bonds at t = 1. To solve the model we follow the same steps
as in the previous section. The main text gives the outline of the arguments. The detailed
proofs are in the Appendix.
Liquidity management. In order to manage their liquidity needs at t = 1 banks choose
a fraction of government bond holdings to sell, βS
k, a fraction of liquid asset holdings to be
reinvested in the liquid asset, γ1
k, a fraction of liquid asset holdings to be used to acquire
more government bonds, γ2
k, and how much to borrow/lend in the interbank market, Lk.






















































and feasibility constraints: 0 ≤ βS




l ≤ 1 and Ll ≥ 0.
A bank that has received a high liquidity shock, type-h, will be a borrower in the interbank23
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P1 + Lh (15)
and feasibility constraints: 0 ≤ βS




h ≤ 1 and Lh ≥ 0.
Access to bonds changes the liquidity management of banks as follows. Banks hold
β
P0
units of bonds. They can sell a fraction βS
k of their bond holdings at price P1. Hence, the
amount of funds available at t = 1 is the sum of liquid asset holdings, 1 − α − β, and the
proceeds from selling bonds, βS
k
β
P0P1. Banks can also acquire new bonds using γ2
k fraction of
their liquid asset holdings.
At t = 2, banks earn return Y per unit of bond holdings. The return is earned on bonds
bought at t = 0 that were not sold at t =1 ,( 1− βS
k)
β
P0 units, and on additional bonds










































The left-hand side of (16) is the value of bonds sold by banks at t = 1 while the right-hand
side is the amount available to buy them. The demand for bonds at t = 1 will depend on
how much banks decide to hold in liquid assets at t =0 ,1− α − β.
As before, banks need to satisfy households demand for liquidity at t = 1. Access to
safe government bonds will however reduce the amount that banks in need of liquidity must
borrow unsecured. Acquiring liquidity through the sale of bonds is cheaper since the provider
of liquidity (the buyer of the bond) does not need to be compensated for credit risk. To24
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focus on the more interesting case in which the trading of bonds and unsecured interbank
lending coexist, we assume that there are not enough bonds to fully cover banks’ liquidity
shortage at t =1 .
The introduction of bonds does not change the marginal value of liquidity. It is still given
by Lemma 1.
A bank with a shortage of liquidity at t = 1 will neither sell its bonds to reinvest in the
liquid asset nor will it hold on to them. It will sell them in order to reduce the amount it
needs to borrow in the unsecured interbank market.
Lemma 4 (Liquidity management of a bank with a shortage) A bank with a liquid-
ity shortage will not reinvest, neither in bonds nor in the liquid asset, γ1
h =0 ,γ2
h =0 , and it
will sell all its bonds: βS
h =1 .
Since bonds are scarce and the unsecured market is active, banks with a surplus of
liquidity must still ﬁnd it attractive to lend unsecured. The return on bonds must not be
larger than the return on unsecured lending. Since lenders need to be compensated for credit
risk in unsecured lending, banks with a shortage of liquidity will sell all their bonds ﬁrst and
then borrow the remaining amount.
Given that banks with a liquidity shortage sell bonds and borrow in the unsecured market,
banks with a liquidity surplus must buy bonds and lend unsecured.
Lemma 5 (Liquidity management of a bank with a surplus) A bank with a liquidity
surplus will buy additional bonds: γ1
l =0 , γ2
l > 0 and βS
l =0 .
Using the results in Lemma 4 and 5, we can simplify (16), the market clearing condition






l (1 − α − β). (17)
Market clearing in the bond market and the unsecured interbank market yields:25
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Lemma 6 (Interbank market clearing) The amount of the liquid asset held by banks
exactly balances the aggregate payout to households at t =1 :
λc1 =1− α − β.
As before, trading at t = 1 fully smoothes out the idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
Pricing liquidity. Since both the bond market and the unsecured loan market are open,
there must not be an arbitrage opportunity between the two markets at t =1 :
Y
P1
=ˆ p(1 + r) ≥ 1. (18)
Buying bonds and unsecured lending must oﬀer the same return. Moreover, the return must
be weakly larger than one since otherwise banks would prefer to reinvest into the liquid asset.
As before, banks are price takers in the market for unsecured interbank loans. The price
at which banks engage in decentralized trading must be consistent with an interior portfolio
allocation, 0 <α<1 and 0 <β<1. Investing everything into bonds is inconsistent with
satisfying households’ need for liquidity at t =1 . All banks would have to sell bonds and no
bank would be able to buy bonds. Hence, β<1. Since bonds are not subject to credit risk,
banks with high liquidity shocks prefer to sell them rather than borrow unsecured. Since
there is a positive probability of a high liquidity shock ex ante, banks want to hold some
bonds, β>0. Banks will also have to hold the liquid asset to satisfy the demand for liquidity
at t =1 ,α<1. Finally, the proﬁtability of the illiquid asset implies α>0.











β +ˆ p(1 + r)Ll − (1 − λl)c2] (19)
+ πhp[Rα − (1 + r)Lh − (1 − λh)c2]26
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subject to










where we have used the results in Lemma 4 and 5 on banks’ liquidity management and
market clearing in the bond market (17) in order to substitute for γ2
l .
The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior allocation of the illiquid asset, α,i s
p[R − πlˆ p(1 + r) − πh(1 + r)] = 0. (20)
As in the case without access to bonds, the proportion of interbank loans that are not
repaid is given by the probability of being insolvent since lenders hold a fully diversiﬁed





Condition (21) is identical to condition (8). The cost of unsecured borrowing is not aﬀected
by the access to bonds.
Due to the no-arbitrage condition between bonds and unsecured loans (equation (18)),







The condition immediately implies that Y
P1 > 1 since pR > 1 and δ<1. That is, bonds
trade at a discount at t = 1. Lenders must be compensated for providing liquidity. If
bonds did not trade at a discount, then holding the liquid asset to lend it out unsecured is
not very attractive. The no-arbitrage condition would imply that p(1 + r) = 1 and hence27
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δ , which is inconsistent with α<1. Banks would invest everything into the
illiquid asset.
The requirement on an interior portfolio allocation for bonds ties down the price of bonds
at t =0 .
Lemma 7 The price of bonds at t =0is equal to the price at t =1 :
P0 = P1. (23)
Given that bonds and liquid asset holdings must coexist at t = 0 in order to manage
liquidity shocks at t = 1, it is intuitive that the ﬁrst-period yield on bonds equals the return
on the liquid asset.
The following proposition summarizes the pricing of bonds and unsecured interbank loans:
Proposition 3 (Pricing) The interest rate in the unsecured market is 1+r = R
δ . The yield





Portfolio allocation. As in the case without access to bonds, banks’ portfolio allocation
(α,β) must lead to a payout to households that is consistent with i) market clearing at t =1
and ii) a full payout at t = 2 such that banks make zero proﬁts if they are solvent and
the payout is not contingent on k = l,h. The following Proposition and its derivation are
analogous to Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 (Portfolio allocation) Banks’ portfolio allocation across the liquid and
illiquid asset satisﬁes:
α










1 − α − β
(1 − λl) − (1 − λh)p
λh − λl
. (24)
The fraction invested in bonds is given by market clearing at t =0 : β = BP0 = δ BY
pR .28
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The left-hand side of (24) is as in (10), except that we have to subtract the bond holdings
β to obtain the investment in the liquid asset. The ﬁrst-term on the right-hand side is the
same as in the case without bonds. The second term captures the eﬀect of having access to
government bonds. Note that if β = 0 and B = 0, then equation (24) reduces to equation
(10). Banks hold a more liquid portfolio ceteris paribus when they have access to bonds.
Bonds provide banks with a safe return at t = 2 so that banks need to invest less into the
illiquid investment in order to satisfy withdrawals at t = 2. At the same time, trading bonds
is a valuable alternative to the unsecured interbank market.
The size of the banking sector relative to the amount of bonds available matters. The
eﬀect of bonds on the investment in liquid and illiquid assets is stronger when the ratio of
the value of bonds to the expected value of banks’ productive assets, BY
pR , is larger. Finally,
banks’ bond holdings are proportional to the relative size of bonds to banks’ productive
assets, BY
pR , and the constant of proportionality is given by the risk discount factor in the
unsecured market, δ.
The eﬀect of bonds on ex ante liquidity holdings is stronger when there is more credit
risk (lower p), there are more withdrawals at banks with a liquidity surplus (higher λl) and
less withdrawals at banks with a liquidity shortage (lower λh).
Suppose that banks are equally likely to have a liquidity shortage or a liquidity surplus,
πl = πh = 1
2. Then more credit risk increases the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side (see
condition (11)). It also increases the second term on the right-hand side, making the overall
impact of more credit risk on banks’ portfolio choice ambiguous.
5 Empirical implications
Looking at Figures 1 and 2, it seems that repo markets secured by government bonds in the
US and in the euro area followed diﬀerent dynamics between August 2007 and May 2009.
Below, we discuss empirical predictions of the model that may help explain the developments.29
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Decoupling of secured and unsecured rates. Government bonds become relatively
more valuable if the credit risk problem becomes more severe, i.e. as p decreases. To see










Higher credit risk increases the credit risk premium 1
δ leading to a higher interest on unse-
cured lending 1 + r. A higher interest on unsecured lending decreases the price of bonds
ceteris paribus, see equation (18). But there is a second, countervailing eﬀect since the yield
on safe bonds must be equal to the expected return on risky interbank loans. Overall, the
second eﬀect dominates since the credit risk premium 1
δ does not increase one for one with
changes in p. Ex ante, a bank is uncertain whether it will be a lender, and thus exposed
to credit risk, or not. In sum, following a shock to credit risk, unsecured rates and rates
secured by government bonds move in opposite directions.
Changes in the perception of credit risk can explain why secured and unsecured rates
decoupled with the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in August 2007, around the sale of Bear
Stearns and following the Lehman bankruptcy. In the summer of 2007, the discovery of sub-
prime mortgages in the portfolio of banks and bank-sponsored conduits led to a market-wide
reassessment of credit risk. Bear Stearns caused a temporary turbulence, while the failure
of Lehman led to a dramatic revision of expected default probabilities.
Spillovers and credit risk levels. The potential for spillover eﬀects from the unsecured
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for all p>0.
It follows that the elasticity of the price of government bonds to credit risk is the lowest
for p = 1 (no credit risk) since the elasticity is decreasing in p. This is consistent with the
fact that the decoupling between the secured and unsecured rates was most pronounced in
the aftermath of the Lehman failure when the perceived level of credit risk in the banking
sector was very high.
Relative scarcity of collateral. How does the scarcity of the underlying collateral
aﬀect the dynamics of repo rates when credit risk increases? Our model implies that the
sensitivity of the price of government bonds to credit risk is lower in a country with a larger

























1 − α − β
(1 − λl) − (1 − λh)p
λh − λl
. (25)







1 − α − β
(1 − λl) − (1 − λh)p
λh − λl
πlλl + πhλh
πl(1 − λl)+πh(1 − λh)p
< 0. (26)
Hence, if there is an unexpected shock to the amount of government bonds available in the
banking sector, i.e. B decreases (say, due to a high demand for these securities outside the
banking sector at the time when banks need to cope with liquidity shocks), then the price of
bonds P1 must increase. Taking the derivative of (26) with respect to p, we get the desired
11Ex ante, the supply of bonds B has no impact on the price of bonds (see Proposition 3).31
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(1 − λl) − (1 − λh)p
πl(1 − λl)+πh(1 − λh)p

=
−(1 − λh)(1− λl)
(πl(1 − λl)+πh(1 − λh)p)
2 < 0.
With the onset of the crisis in August 2007, repo rates in the US became much more
volatile than in the euro area. We document this in Figure 5, which plots the spread between
the three-month repo rate secured by government bonds and the yield on the three-month
government bond. H¨ ordahl and King (2008) argue that the higher volatility in the US
can be partly explained by the increased “safe haven” demand for US Treasury securities,
which made Treasuries relatively scarce. The Fed responded by introducing measures that
increased the supply of high quality collateral for private repo markets. We discuss policy
responses further in Section 6.
Aggregate liquidity shocks. If there is an unanticipated shock to the relative propor-
tion of banks with high and low liquidity demands,
πh
πl , then liquidity becomes more scarce
and even the price of government bonds declines. To show that this is the case, we apply
the Implicit Function Theorem to (25). It is straightforward to show that the sign of the
derivative of P1 with respect to
πh

























this derivative is negative. Note that for λh >λ l, which is what we assume,
λh(1−λl)
λl(1−λh) > 1
and thus the inequality above always holds. It follows that P1 declines after an unexpected
increase in the aggregate demand for liquidity,
πh
πl .
Following the same steps, it follows that the unsecured rate 1 + r must increase if the
aggregate demand for liquidity increases. Consequently, both secured and unsecured rates32
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Figure 5: Tensions in Treasury-backed repo markets, EA and US
would move in the same direction after an unexpected aggregate liquidity shock, i.e. the
decoupling of rates cannot be explained by such a shock.
6 Policy implications
Unsecured markets are particularly vulnerable to changes in the perceived creditworthiness
of counterparties. In repo transactions, such concerns are mitigated to some extent by the
presence of collateral. Yet, our model illustrates how tensions in the unsecured market spill
over to the market secured by collateral of the highest quality. Moreover, the volatility of
repo rates can be exacerbated by structural characteristics such as the scarcity of securities
that are used as collateral.33
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Central banks are particularly concerned with the well functioning of interbank markets
because it is an important element in the transmission of monetary policy, and because
persisting tensions may aﬀect the ﬁnancing conditions faced by non-ﬁnancial corporations
and households. In many countries, central banks have reacted to the observed tensions by
introducing measures to support the interbank market, trying to avoid market-wide liquidity
problems turning into solvency problems for individual institutions. The aim of this Section
is to examine a number of policy responses implemented since August 2007 that aimed at
reducing tensions in interbank markets.
Speciﬁcally, we examine how the range of collateral accepted by a central bank aﬀects the
liquidity conditions of banks and how central banks can help alleviate tensions associated
with the scarcity of high-quality collateral. In line with the predictions of the model, we
present evidence that these measures can be eﬀective in reducing tensions in secured markets.
At the same time, they are not designed to resolve the underlying problems in the unsecured
segment and the associated spill-overs, if those are driven by credit risk concerns.
6.1 Collateral accepted by the central bank
Central banks provide liquidity to the banking sector against eligible collateral. The range
of acceptable collateral varies across countries. Since the onset of the crisis, however, central
banks have generally lowered the minimum credit rating and increased the quantity of lending
they provide. For example, the Fed expanded its collateral list for repo operations in March,
May and September 2008, in response to market tensions. Moreover, it established the Term
Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007. The TAF provides term credit through periodic
auctions to a broader range of counterparties and against a broader range of collateral than
open market operations. The Fed stressed that “this facility could help ensure that liquidity
provisions can be disseminated eﬃciently even when the unsecured interbank markets are
under stress”.12 The ECB headed into the crisis with the broadest list of eligible collateral
12Press release of the Federal Reserve Board on December 12, 2007.34
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among its peers, including nonmarketable securities and commercial loans. As a result,
the ECB made no changes until mid-October 2008, when it expanded the eligible collateral
signiﬁcantly and lowered the minimum credit rating from A– to BBB– as the crisis intensiﬁed.
What are the implications of a wider range of collateral accepted in a central bank’s
operations according to our model? First, allowing securities other than Treasuries can
reduce the volatility of the repo rates backed by Treasuries as it reduces the pressure on
acquiring Treasury securities and the limits imposed by their ﬁxed supply. Moreover, we
showed that if there is an unexpected aggregate liquidity shock, funding pressures can appear
in all interbank market segments. By providing liquidity, a central bank can counter the
eﬀects of aggregate shocks and ensure that ﬁnancial institutions do not sell their assets,
including Treasuries, at distressed prices.
How eﬀective were changes to the collateral framework of central banks during the crisis?
McAndrews, Asani and Wang (2008) provide evidence that the introduction of the TAF
was associated with downward shifts of the Libor by reducing the liquidity risk premium.
Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch (2009) analyze the role of the TAF in reducing the
spreads between term Libor rates and the yield on Treasuries of corresponding maturity.
They construct a counterfactual path and conclude that in the absence of the TAF, the
Libor would have been higher. On the other hand, Taylor and Williams (2009) argue that the
TAF had no signiﬁcant impact on interest rate spreads as it did not address the fundamental
problem of credit risk on banks’ balance sheets.
6.2 Upgrading collateral
If concerns about the creditworthiness of counterparties make it expensive to borrow in
the unsecured market, ﬁnancial institutions try to obtain more funds in the secured market.
However, we show that if the underlying collateral is scarce, repo market rates will be volatile.
Measures aimed at increasing the supply of collateral can thus improve the allocation of
liquidity in interbank markets.35
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For example, the Fed introduced the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) in March
2008. It lends Treasury securities to dealers, taking less liquid securities, including agency
debt securities and mortgage-backed securities, as collateral. The Treasury securities are
allocated to dealers via auctions.13 The primary dealers then use those Treasury securities
to obtain ﬁnancing in private repo markets. The TSLF thus increases the ability of dealers
to obtain ﬁnancing and decreases their need to sell assets into illiquid markets. The direct
beneﬁts that can be expected from the TSLF are, ﬁrst, an increase in the supply of Treasury
collateral in the private repo market, and, second, a reduction of the supply of less liquid
collateral.
The TSLF is closely related to the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, which is also available
to primary dealers. A key diﬀerence is that the PDCF is a standing facility whereas the TSLF
is an auction facility. As a standing facility, the PDCF oﬀers the advantage of availability
on a continuous basis. It also accepts a broader class of securities as collateral. Whereas the
TAF (discussed in the previous section) is only available to depository institutions, the TSLF
is available to primary dealers. Both programs address the tensions in interbank markets
via diﬀerent market participants.
Fleming, Hrung and Keane (2009) provide evidence of the impact of the introduction of
the TSLF on repo spreads between Treasury collateral and lower quality collateral. They
document that the introduction of the TSLF was associated with an increase in repo rates
relative to the fed funds rate. This is consistent with the predictions of our model that
reducing the scarcity of high quality collateral should result in higher Treasury repo rates.
Moreover, the introduction of the TSLF narrowed ﬁnancing spreads during spring 2008,
particularly after the ﬁrst auction. Much of the narrowing seems to have come from an
increase in Treasury rates rather than a decrease of the rates for non-Treasury collateral.
13The TSLF is divided into two schedules: Schedule 1 TSLF operations (i.e. auctions for Treasury and
agency securities) are separated from Schedule 2 TSLF operations (i.e. Schedule 1 plus other investment
grade collateral). Schedule 2 collateral originally included Schedule 1 collateral plus AAA/Aaa-rated non-
agency residential MBS, commercial MBS, and agency collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). Schedule
2 collateral was expanded to include AAA/Aaa-rated asset-backed securities starting with the May 8, 2008
auction and all investment-grade debt securities starting with the September 17, 2008 auction.36
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7 Conclusion
Despite the presence of collateral, the disruptions in the unsecured interbank market during
the 2007-2009 ﬁnancial crisis have also aﬀected secured markets. This paper presents a model
of secured and unsecured interbank lending in the presence of credit risk. Credit risk premia
in the unsecured market will aﬀect the price of riskless bonds when they are used to manage
banks’ liquidity shocks.
Going forward, our analysis points to a number of issues for further research. First, the
size of the banking sector relative to the amount of collateral matters. We saw that the
presence of bonds reduces the amount banks have to borrow in unsecured markets. The
positive eﬀect of bonds is stronger when the ratio of banks’ balance sheet to the value of
bonds is larger. Hence, the interplay between the relative size of banking, ﬁnancial markets
and the economy deserves further attention.
Second, our analysis abstracted from risk sharing concerns. Banks were simply maxi-
mizing the total amount of demandable liabilities. Still, we obtain a credit risk premium in
unsecured interbank markets. Introducing risk aversion of banks’ customers is beyond the
scope of this paper and constitutes a fruitful avenue for further research. With respect to
the spillover of credit risk across interbank markets, we anticipate that risk aversion can add
an additional premium that would exacerbate the tensions that we identiﬁed.
Third, we assumed that the various shocks in our model are uncorrelated. The ﬁnancial
crisis has made it painfully clear that in reality, the risk embedded in banks’ illiquid assets,
their liquidity needs and shocks to collateral values are interlinked. The challenge will
therefore be to model and analyze the joint distribution of the risks in banks’ balance sheets,
especially “at the tail”. Banks’ risk management practices have to take into account the
forces aﬀecting diﬀerent collateral classes and the market’s response in times of stress when
liquidity and high quality collateral are scarce.37
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
The interbank market is active so that constraints Lk ≥ 0 are slack. Let μk be the Lagrange
multiplier on the budget constraint. The ﬁrst-order condition for a lender w.r.t. Ll is
pˆ p(1 + r) − μ
l =0 , (27)
while the ﬁrst-order condition for a borrower w.r.t. to Lh is:
−p(1 + r)+μ
h =0 . (28)
Proof of Lemma 2
Let μk
1 be the Lagrange multipliers on 0 ≤ γ1
k. The constraint γ1
k ≤ 1 cannot be binding
since otherwise all available funds at t = 1 are reinvested and nothing can be paid or lent
out. The ﬁrst-order condition for a type-k bank w.r.t. to γ1
k is
(1 − α)(p − μ
k)+μ
k
1 =0 . (29)
Substituting μh = p(1 + r) (Lemma 1) yields
(1 − α)(−pr)=−μ
h
1 < 0, (30)
since left hand side is negative. It cannot be zero since α = 1 cannot be optimal. A type-h
bank would have to ﬁnance its entire need for liquidity by borrowing in the interbank
market at a rate r>0 whereas it could just store some liquidity without cost using the
short-term asset. Since −μh
1 < 0 we have γ1
h =0 .
Consider now the case of a lender. Substituting μl = pˆ p(1 + r) (Lemma 1) into (29) yields
(1 − α)p(1 − ˆ p(1 + r)) = −μ
l
1.
Again, α = 1 cannot be optimal. A type-l bank cannot invest everything into the illiquid
asset and still lend in the interbank market. Hence, γ1
l = 0 if and only if ˆ p(1 + r) ≥ 1( w e
assume that a type-l bank does not reinvest into the liquid asset when the condition holds
as an equality).
Proof of Lemma 3
Using the binding budget constraints from the optimization problems (1) and (2) (Lemma
1) to substitute for Ll and Lh in the market clearing condition πlLl = πhLh and using
γ1
k = 0 (Lemma 2) gives the result.40
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1107
November 2009
Proof of Lemma 4















where μh is the marginal value of liquidity for a borrower (given by Lemma 1) and μh
1 is
the multiplier on the feasibility constraint γ1




since we are considering interior portfolio allocations, 1 − α − β>0. Since
μh = p(1 + r) >p , we have that μh
1 > 0 and thus γ1
h = 0. As in the case without bonds, a
borrower does not reinvest into the liquid asset.

















2 =0 , (31)
where μl is the marginal value of liquidity for a lender (given by Lemma 1) and μl
2 is the
multiplier on the feasibility constraint γ2
l ≥ 0. Note that the feasibility constraint
γ1
l + γ2
l ≤ 1 must be automatically satisﬁed since otherwise all available funds at t = 1 are




≤ ˆ p(1 + r). (32)
The yield on the bond at t = 1 must be less or equal to the expected return of unsecured
interbank lending (given that the unsecured interbank market is open).
The ﬁrst-order condition of a borrower with respect to bond purchases at t =1 ,γ2
h,i s
















2 is the multiplier on the feasibility constraint γ2
h ≥ 0. Due to condition (32), we
have that μh
2 > 0 and hence γ2
h = 0. A borrower does not reinvest using bonds either.





























4 are the Lagrange multipliers on 0 ≤ βS
h ≤ 1. Using γ1
h =0 ,γ2
h = 0 and










Due to condition (32), the term is squared brackets is positive. For the condition to hold, it
must be that μh
4 > 0, and hence βS
h = 1. The borrower sells all his bonds at t =1 .41
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Proof of Lemma 5

















where we have used βS
h = 1 and γ2
h = 0. Market clearing therefore requires that γ2
l > 0.
Since borrowers sell bonds, lenders must buy them.
Given that γ2
l > 0, and hence μl
2 = 0, the lender’s ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
bond purchases (31) requires that
Y
P1
=ˆ p(1 + r). (33)
The yield on safe bonds must be equal to the expected return on risky interbank loans as
both markets are open.





























4 are the Lagrange multipliers on 0 ≤ βS














4 =0 . (34)
It cannot be that P1 >Y since lenders would not want to buy any bonds at t = 1. When
P1 <Y then μl
3 > 0 and hence βS
l =0 .I fP1 = Y then we can let βS
l = 0 without loss of
generality. To see, this plug P1 = Y and ˆ p(1 + r) = 1 (see condition (33)) into the lender’s
problem at t = 1 (equations (12) and (13)):
p[Rα +( 1− α − β)+
β
P0
Y − λlc1 − (1 − λl)c2], (35)
where we substituted the budget constraint into the objective function using Ll. The
objective function is independent of βS
l .
The ﬁrst-order condition of a lender with respect to reinvesting into the liquid asset at
t =1 ,γ1
l ,i s






where we used βS
l = 0, the lender’s marginal value of liquidity μl = pˆ p(1 + r) and (33). We
have ruled out that P1 >Y. When P1 = Y , the lender’s problem is independent of γ1
l (see
(35)) and we can set γ1
l = 0 without loss of generality. When P1 <Y, then μl
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Proof of Lemma 6
As in the proof of Lemma 3. The extra element is the presence of γ2
l , the amount of bonds
bought by banks with a liquidity surplus. But we can use the condition on market clearing
in the bond market (17) to solve for γ2
l .
Proof of Lemma 7





+ˆ p(1 + r)(−πl − πh
P1
P0











+ πh(1 − p)P1

.
Using (18) to substitute for Y
1+r results in P0 = P1
(1−πh)p+πh
pπl+πh which gives the desired result
since 1 − πh = πl.







(1 − α − β)+p(1 + r)[(1 − γ
2
l )(1 − α − β) − λlc1]+
β
P0
Y − (1 − λl)c2 =0
and that
Rα − (1 + r)[λhc1 − (1 − α − β) −
β
P0
P1] − (1 − λh)c2 =0 ,
where we have used the results from Lemma 1, 4, 5 and (7). The amount of bonds
purchased γ2
l is given by market clearing in the bond market (equation (16), or after
simpliﬁcation, (17)).
Using the result for c1 from Lemma 6, using one condition above to solve for c2 and




1 − α − β
=




1 − α − β
(1 − λl) − (1 − λh)p
λh − λl
. (36)
Combining (36) with the result in Proposition 3 gives the desired result.43
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1107
November 2009
European Central Bank Working Paper Series
For a complete list of Working Papers published by the ECB, please visit the ECB’s website 
(http://www.ecb.europa.eu).
1077 “The reception of public signals in financial markets – what if central bank communication becomes stale?” 
by M. Ehrmann and D. Sondermann, August 2009.
1078 “On the real effects of private equity investment: evidence from new business creation” by A. Popov 
and P. Roosenboom, August 2009.
1079 “EMU and European government bond market integration” by P. Abad and H. Chuliá, and M. Gómez-Puig, 
August 2009.
1080 “Productivity and job flows: heterogeneity of new hires and continuing jobs in the business cycle” by J. Kilponen 
and J. Vanhala, August 2009.
1081 “Liquidity premia in German government bonds” by J. W. Ejsing and J. Sihvonen, August 2009.
1082 “Disagreement among forecasters in G7 countries” by J. Dovern, U. Fritsche and J. Slacalek, August 2009.
1083 “Evaluating microfoundations for aggregate price rigidities: evidence from matched firm-level data on product 
prices and unit labor cost” by M. Carlsson and O. Nordström Skans, August 2009.
1084 “How are firms’ wages and prices linked: survey evidence in Europe” by M. Druant, S. Fabiani, G. Kezdi, 
A. Lamo, F. Martins and R. Sabbatini, August 2009.
1085 “An empirical study on the decoupling movements between corporate bond and CDS spreads” 
by I. Alexopoulou, M. Andersson and O. M. Georgescu, August 2009.
1086 “Euro area money demand: empirical evidence on the role of equity and labour markets” by G. J. de Bondt, 
September 2009.
1087 “Modelling global trade flows: results from a GVAR model” by M. Bussière, A. Chudik and G. Sestieri, 
September 2009.
1088 “Inflation perceptions and expectations in the euro area: the role of news” by C. Badarinza and M. Buchmann, 
September 2009. 
1089 “The effects of monetary policy on unemployment dynamics under model uncertainty: evidence from the US 
and the euro area” by C. Altavilla and M. Ciccarelli, September 2009.
1090 “New Keynesian versus old Keynesian government spending multipliers” by J. F. Cogan, T. Cwik, J. B. Taylor 
and V. Wieland, September 2009.
1091 “Money talks” by M. Hoerova, C. Monnet and T. Temzelides, September 2009.
1092 “Inflation and output volatility under asymmetric incomplete information” by G. Carboni and M. Ellison, 
September 2009.
1093 “Determinants of government bond spreads in new EU countries” by I. Alexopoulou, I. Bunda and A. Ferrando, 
September 2009.
1094 “Signals from housing and lending booms” by I. Bunda and M. Ca’Zorzi, September 2009.
1095 “Memories of high inflation” by M. Ehrmann and P. Tzamourani, September 2009.44
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1107
November 2009
1096 “The determinants of bank capital structure” by R. Gropp and F. Heider, September 2009.
1097 “Monetary and fiscal policy aspects of indirect tax changes in a monetary union” by A. Lipińska and 
L. von Thadden, October 2009.
1098 “Gauging the effectiveness of quantitative forward guidance: evidence from three inflation targeters” 
by M. Andersson and B. Hofmann, October 2009.
1099 “Public and private sector wages interactions in a general equilibrium model” by G. Fernàndez de Córdoba, 
J.J. Pérez and J. L. Torres, October 2009.
1100 “Weak and strong cross section dependence and estimation of large panels” by A. Chudik, M. Hashem Pesaran 
and E. Tosetti, October 2009.
1101 “Fiscal variables and bond spreads – evidence from eastern European countries and Turkey” by C. Nickel, 
P. C. Rother and J. C. Rülke, October 2009.
1102 “Wage-setting behaviour in France: additional evidence from an ad-hoc survey” by J. Montornés 
and J.-B. Sauner-Leroy, October 2009.
1103 “Inter-industry wage differentials: how much does rent sharing matter?” by P. Du Caju, F. Rycx and I. Tojerow, 
October 2009.
1104 “Pass-through of external shocks along the pricing chain: a panel estimation approach for the euro area” 
by B. Landau and F. Skudelny, November 2009.
1105 “Downward nominal and real wage rigidity: survey evidence from European firms” by J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, 
T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm, November 2009.
1106 “The margins of labour cost adjustment: survey evidence from European firms” by J. Babecký, P. Du Caju, 
T. Kosma, M. Lawless, J. Messina and T. Rõõm, November 2009.
1107 “Interbank lending, credit risk premia and collateral” by F. Heider and M. Hoerova, November 2009.Working PaPer SerieS
no 1105 / november 2009
DoWnWarD nominal  
anD real Wage  
rigiDity
Survey eviDence 
from euroPean  
firmS
by Jan Babecký, Philip Du Caju, 
Theodora Kosma, Martina Lawless,  
Julián Messina and Tairi Rõõm
WAGE DYNAMICS
NETWORK